The recent 'Chilcot' inquiry judged that British participation in the 2003 Iraq War was neither right nor necessary. When reading the final report of over 2.6 million words, I warn against seeking accountability solely in terms of intent and individual culpability, such as questioning whether the government deceived the public. There also needs to be an examination the rationalities and power relations that allowed figures such as Tony Blair to believe, and still believe, that the war was for the common good. Doing so reveals how the preemptive logics behind the war endure today.
and 'have we exhausted all diplomatic options?' Blair believed these tests were met. Chilcot did not. The inquiry concluded that the government committed several misdeeds and errors. Firstly, the case for war was based on a mistaken belief that Iraq had retained some chemical and biological weapon capabilities, was determined to enhance those capabilities, and was able to conceal them from United Nations inspectors. Secondly, Blair presented this belief to the public with "a certainty that was not justified" (Chilcot 2016). Thirdly, decisions based upon these beliefs were not properly scrutinised. In response, Blair apologized for mistakes made in good faith and with good motives. But he maintained his belief that the decision to invade Iraq was right, necessary and in the common interest of the international community (Blair 2016) . Thomas, O.D. 3 In this paper, I examine the different ways in which accountability for these mistakes and acts of good faith can be understood. While Chilcot provides some explicit recommendations, he also intends the reader to draw her own conclusions (Iraq Inquiry 2016a: 1). Illustrated by the slogans above, the inquiry has been besieged by demands to ask "tough" questions and to put "criminals" on trial. This is indicative of a political discourse that assigns legitimacy to methodological individualism -explaining the social world in terms of the intentional actions of rational, calculating agents (Weber 1978) . I warn against a particular form, commonly found in the criminal courtroom, called juridical individualism.
Juridical individualism restricts accountability to bad apples -that is, actors who intended to commit (or should have known that their actions would lead to) a transgression of the common good. This excludes the question of the bad barrel -that is, the ways in which actors' motivations and perceptions of the common good were constituted. The Iraq Inquiry is an example of how the politics of security is shaped through interplay with everyday forms of public reason (Barnett 2015; Walter and D'Aoust 2015) .
My claim is not that juridical individualism is a fruitless way to understand the pathologies of Britain's role in the Iraq War. The middle section of the paper shows how the inquiry provides an important lesson based on a study of actors' intentions. The inquiry answers a long-standing question as to whether government figures committed acts of deception. Chilcot finds no evidence for this. Instead, the report shows that senior figures like Blair were convinced by their own flawed interpretation of the threat posed by Iraq and refused to allow political opposition the opportunity to challenge this view. Officials concealed information that might have weakened the government's case, Blair avoided Cabinet meetings in which his argument could have been challenged, and when Cabinet did meet there were few who were willing to challenge the Prime Minister. The government violated liberal standards of deliberation such as openness and a willingness to be persuaded (Bjola 2005 ). Chilcot's recommendations attempt to reintroduce these standards, Good faith and (dis)honest mistakes? Learning from Britain's Iraq War Inquiry which might have allowed political opponents to convince the government that the case for war was neither sure nor a last resort.
Yet juridical individualism, holding discrete actors to account in the name of the public good, is limited. Standards of deliberative democracy can provide security against actors with malign intent or apparently defective rationality, but even an ideal speech situation is encased by a particular form of public reason (Dean 1999) . When a majority of actors sincerely believe that they are acting in the public interest, as Blair and many others did, mistakes and acts of good faith risk becoming comprehensible only as a misadventure that could not have been foreseen. Accountability needs to be extended to a study of the rationalities of governance that make violence possible as a social practice of the liberal state. In the final section of the paper, I show how the Chilcot archive contains a hidden lesson about these rationalities. After 11 September 2001, the British government perceived a dramatic change in the nature of terrorism. Blair embraced a logic of pre-emption because he believed that catastrophic threats could occur with little or no warning. This short-circuited the tests of the doctrine of the international community. Coupled with an inspections programme that produced uncertainty about Iraq, and a belief that Iraq would eventually have to be reformed into a free market economy, Blair sincerely believed that invasion was right and immediately necessary for the common good. Understanding the failures of the Iraq War as (dis)honest mistakes overlooks the way in which this logic of preemption continues unabated today. The destruction of uncertain objects has become an ever-present possibility in the security practices of the liberal state. A predilection for juridical individualism leads to a palliative discourse that ignores the rationalities of governance that give rises to these acts liberal violence. Thomas, O.D. 
Official inquiries and juridical individualism
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The purpose of an official inquiry is to find facts and learn lessons from a controversial event (PASC, 2005: 8) . This official account must establish whether a wrongdoing has taken place and, if it has, locate accountability. In so doing, inquiries attempt to re-establish the legitimacy of an authority under suspicion by isolating and sifting out the source of the wrongdoing (Rolston and Scraton 2005: 550). There are, however, many ways to think about this question of complicity (Kauzlarich et al 2003) . Consider the hypothetical example of an inquiry into state-sponsored torture. If torture took place, what is answerable? Aside from those that did the torturing, perhaps some actors gave tacit encouragement by accepting information gained from torture. Perhaps there was bureaucratic failure whereby the activities of the torturers were not properly scrutinised.
Perhaps a majority of the citizenry believe that torture is permissible in ticking bomb circumstances, and perhaps popular films and television programmes glamorise torture in way that reinforces such beliefs. These societal attitudes, and a nonfeasance whereby such attitudes go unchallenged, could be considered complicit as well. The inquiry must decide on where to set the limits of accountability.
These limits are shaped by methodological assumptions. Methods "make social worlds" by adhering to specific understandings of causation, structure and agency, and Juridical individualism assumes that humans are homo economicus, rational utility maximisers.
This facilitates a firm rule of legal doctrine: motive is irrelevant to criminal responsibility.
By assuming that all individuals share the same motive (to seek pleasure and avoid pain), the question of criminality can rest on whether a person intended to commit the alleged act.
If I steal a loaf of bread, and assuming that I did so intentionally and with full knowledge of the law, no one is answerable for the crime except me. Yet homo economicus is an abstraction that ignores and depoliticises the social and political contexts within which motives are formed (Ferber and Nelson 1993) . This depoliticising effect is not an accident -it is essential to the maintenance of a liberal, capitalist society. Before juridical individualism, those charged with theft often justified their actions through abject poverty.
Defendants could claim that they were not answerable for their crimes, rather the true injustice lay in the unequal distribution of wealth -so their disobedience of property law was grounded in public right (Norrie 2014: 45) . Homo economicus made such claims irrelevant. The individual could be isolated and theft could be punished so long as there was intent to steal. This juridical individualism thus protected a particular notion of the public interest grounded in the distribution of property amongst the middle class. It did so by focussing on the question of what humans did whilst excluding the question of why they did it.
This juridical individualism can be found in the workings of official inquiries (Wight 2003; Coole 2005) , reflecting a public discourse that recognises juridical methods as the most rigorous and legitimate means of conducting an investigation (Hanretty 2013 ). This discourse has been visible around the Chilcot inquiry. When the inquiry began in 2009, it was criticised for its lack of legal powers to require evidence under oath, and its lack of Thomas, O.D. 7 scope to explicitly apportion individual blame, criminality and civil liability. The late MP Michael Meacher argued that the inquiry was "in keeping with this insidious culture of nonculpability" (2009) . At the inquiry's public hearings, these calls intensified. When Tony Blair gave evidence to the inquiry in January 2010, a large crowd gathered outside the building in which the hearing took place. Some carried familiar placards slogans alleging the former Prime Minister's guilt: "BLAIR LIED THOUSANDS DIED" and "BLIAR".
Others, such as the campaign group 38 Degrees, encouraged Chilcot to ask Blair "tough" Herring and Robinson 2014). If an act of deception took place, this would not necessarily Thomas, O.D. 9 mean that actors lied -that is, made a claim known to be false. Deception also includes forms of concealment or spin whereby an actor withholds or manipulates information in order encourage the audience to reach a conclusion known to be inaccurate (Herring and Robinson 2014: 558) . Either way, an intention to mislead would invalidate the claim that the UK was sure of its case and sure that war was a last resort. In this section, I show how Chilcot's analysis of the government's failings follows an individualist path. The inquiry judged that the case for war was not right or necessary because, while there was an "ingrained belief" that Iraq was an urgent threat and possessed WMD, this belief was not properly challenged and was presented to the public with "a certainty that was not justified" ). This does not necessarily constitute a deception but does demonstrate an unwillingness to engage in a frank debate. Had the opportunity arisen, the government may have been defeated by the force of better argument. Street had ordered for the dossier to be "sexed-up" with a claim that the government "probably knew" to be false (Hutton 2004: 105) . This was the claim that some of Iraq's WMD were "ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them" (HM Government 2002: 4), which led several British newspapers to report that citizens were at risk of attack from chemical or biological weapons mounted on long-range missiles. Hutton dismissed the allegation because, in his view, "sexing up" amounted to an allegation of lying -making a statement "known or believed to be false or unreliable" (Hutton 2004: 144) . Strictly speaking, the government did not lie. Rather the dossier did not make it clear that the 45-minute claim referred only to battlefield munitions, not long-range missiles.
Good faith and (dis)honest mistakes? Learning from Britain's Iraq War Inquiry
In February 2004, the Butler inquiry conducted a broader investigation of whether the government's public claims in the dossier and elsewhere had fairly represented the available secret intelligence. Butler concluded that the dossier "went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence" (Butler 2004: 82) . The government had advocated a particular interpretation of the intelligence, which Butler demonstrated by publishing extracts of the dossier side by side with the secret intelligence upon which the extracts were based.
TABLE ONE HERE
As the example illustrates, the dossier lacked the warnings contained in the raw intelligence and thereby may have given "the impression that the government possessed fuller and firmer intelligence than was the case" (Butler 2004: 82) . Yet rather than an intentional deception, Butler judged that the authors had succumbed to a "groupthink" and were advocating an interpretation that they believed to be accurate (2004: 110). Blair stated that he believed the intelligence on Iraq was "extensive, detailed and authoritative", but the JIC assessments described intelligence as "sporadic and patchy" (Butler 2004: 164) . Speaking in 2016 Butler explained, "I don't call that a lie. [Blair] may well have thought it was extensive, detailed and authoritative but it wasn't" (Butler 2016 There also evidence that officials deliberatively concealed information that could have weakened the government's argument. The Chair of the JIC explicitly recommended "obscuring" the fact that the intelligence suggested "nothing exceptional" about Iraq compared to other "countries of concern" such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya (Scarlett 2002; Iraq Inquiry 2016c: 76) . Similarly, there were frequent concerns that the intelligence did not make a strong case for military action. Alastair Campbell wrote in his diary that the hardest question to answer was: "Why now? What was it that we knew now that we didn't before that made us believe we had to do it now?" (Campbell in Iraq Inquiry 2016c: 140).
Thirdly, caveats and qualifications that highlighted the uncertainty of the intelligence were 
13
In sum, a focus on individual intent reveals a significant pathology insomuch as some figures with the Blair government displayed contempt for "the force of better argument" (Habermas 1996: 305; Strong 2017) . Whilst the advocates for war may have been sincere, other standards of liberal publicity such as openness and a willingness to be persuaded were conspicuous by their absence. In response, Chilcot has provided specific lessons which attempt to reintroduce better deliberative testing of government policy (Iraq Inquiry 2016a: 129-141. When making use of secret intelligence, for example, there should be a clearer separation between analysis that can inform public debate, and policy arguments intended to persuade public debate. Future governments also need to make greater use of Cabinet as a space of free and fearless debate. In totality, these suggestions amount to an additional test for the doctrine of the international community: it is not enough to believe that the first five tests have been met, one must also be able to convince others and do so in a manner that avoids deception (Ralph 2011: 321).
There is, however, a limit to this individualist diagnosis. Deliberative standards can protect the community against individuals with the intent to deceive. But advocates for particular policy options, provided that they are sincere, will only be challenged when there is a will to do so. Even an ideal speech situation will always be limited by the rationalities of the participants (Dean 1999). Blair, and many others inside and outside government, sincerely believed that invasion was in the national interest. After Chilcot announced his findings, Blair accepted that he failed to challenge the intelligence, but maintained that here had been no intent to do wrong; the decision was "made in good faith" and "the world was and is better off without Saddam" (2016a). As well as asking whether Blair was sincere, open and willing to debate, we also need to ask how it was possible for Blair to believe that invasion was an act of collective security at all. What matters is not just whether individuals intended to obstruct deliberation in order to promote a particular claim, but how that claim to the common good was possible and reasonable. This extends accountability beyond intent toward to the constituents of motive. In the next section, I show how the inquiry Good faith and (dis)honest mistakes? Learning from Britain's Iraq War Inquiry report can also provide a problematisation of the ways of thinking that made the British case for war possible.
A lesson lost? The inevitable mistakes of preemption
At the heart of Britain's case for war was a specific articulation of security. Discourses of security make a political community possible through particular practices and rationalities for both the identification of objects of insecurity and the governance of those objects (Dillon 1996: 12-39) . The government's argument that invasion was an act of collective security was contingent on three interrelated practices and rationalities of governance.
Firstly, the historic inspections regime that was intended to increase trust in the Iraqi regime actually produced greater uncertainty. Secondly, after September 2001 the British government perceived a dramatic change in the nature of terrorism, leading to a shift toward a preemptive rather than precautionary logic of prevention. Finally, the invasion of Iraq was seen an opportunity to hasten its inevitable free market reform. Taken together, these past practices, present anxieties, and future imaginaries allowed the government to believe that the tests of the doctrine of the international community had been met.
After the Gulf War in 1991, the UN attempted to impose a panopticonic surveillance program upon Iraq. Inspectors were given the authority to inspect any place at any time. By giving Iraq the constant impression of its own surveillance, the inspections were intended to make Iraq a docile subject (Debrix 1999) . The all seeing eye, however, exacerbated mistrust and suspicion. Certainty through transparency proved to be an impossible dream, partly because of the behaviour of the Iraqi regime and partly because of the inspections programme itself. In the former, Iraqi officials regularly obstructed the process. When, for instance, the inspectors identified buildings that might contain incriminating evidence, upon arrival they were forced to wait for several hours before being allowed to enter (Blix 2005:33) . In the latter, however, the inspections themselves increased Thomas, O.D. 15 suspicion. The task of the inspections was to prove an absence -that Iraq had disarmed itself. The problem was that "an absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence" (Blix cited in Iraq Inquiry 2016d: 134). When inspectors discovered scraps of evidence, it was often impossible to tell whether these were remnants of a long-gone weapons programme or the first glimpse of a secret plot. The inspections fuelled a suspicion that there was a guilty secret to be found (Thomas 2015) . however, does not explain why the invasion was necessary at that time. The necessity of war was driven by a "fusion" of these concerns with "post-9/11 concerns about mass-casualty Good faith and (dis)honest mistakes? Learning from Britain's Iraq War Inquiry terrorism" (Iraq Inquiry 2016a: 42). It is this fear, the vision of the future it created, and the pre-emptive behaviour that it led to, which I now discuss.
Preemptive action is made reasonable when the future is perceived as uncertain, not only due to a gap in knowledge but because complex interdependencies create the possibility of disasters that could occur with little or no warning. In these circumstances, life is "tensed on the threshold of disaster" (Anderson 2010: 780) . Such threats cannot be addressed through precautionary measures intended to stop an object from reaching a point of irreversible catastrophe. Instead, preemption radically transforms an object that is perceived to be a possible cause of the imminent future threat, because there are no reliable means of predicting this irreversible point of no return. a natural reluctance to do things, made worse by ignorance…of Saddam's capabilities and intentions. We had to correct this, at the same time answer the legitimate question of why we were taking action now. 11 September was a powerful argument for dealing with threats before they materialised…At some point, WMD and terrorism would come together, with appalling consequences, unless we took action. Speaking at the inquiry, Blair argued that the war "isn't about a lie or a conspiracy … it is a decision" and "today, we are going to be faced with exactly the same types of decisions" (Blair 2010 ) Here, Blair is right. Chilcot suggests that the Iraq War was the product of circumstances "unlikely to be repeated again" (Iraq Inquiry 2016c: 129) . But these preemptive logics are found in contemporary security practices. For instance, Good faith and (dis)honest mistakes? Learning from Britain's Iraq War Inquiry Britain's counterterrorism practices act upon identities and behaviours that may be indicative of an emergent threat (Heath-Kelly 2012) . Similarly, drone "signature strikes" kill individuals when their "patterns of life" suggest potentially dangerous future behaviour (Boyle 2013) . Common to all these practices are acts of state violence against objects subsequently revealed to be false positives, but these acts are defended as decisions made in good faith in order to prevent catastrophe. An alternative approach, however, is to understand these so-called mistakes as necessary consequences of pre-emption. These events are not mistakes but rather the resolution of subjects who occupy the space between the trusted community and the imagined attack. Heath-Kelly puts it simply: preemptive logics "lead to slippery trigger fingers " (2012: 83) . The apparent mistake is a necessary consequence of a preemptive rationality coupled with a perceived gap in knowledge, that is impossible to close, between the present behaviour of the object and the terrible future that represents one possible future out of many. By waging war, killing or detaining, the liberal state closes and conceals this gap in knowledge. In order to establish answerability for these practices, we must question the ways of thinking that inform actor's intent. While Blair refused, many now apologise for the mistake of the Iraq War. But by accepting the discourse of the mistake we collude with rather critique the power relations responsible The inquiry concluded that this post-invasion reform failed because Blair and the government failed to plan for anything less than a best case scenario. The challenges, for instance, resulting from Iraq's descent into "internecine" conflict were unanticipated (Iraq Inquiry 2016e: 86) . Yet this criticism concerns only the enactment of a governing rationalitynot the rationality of transforming life in a particular way in order to protect life elsewhere.
In fact, speaking after the publication of the report, Blair reiterated this rationality.
I don't think that this struggle was in vain in the end…I see the struggle that is going on in the Middle East which is all to do with these countries [getting to] religiously tolerant and pluralistic societies, getting to rule-based economies …what we did in removing Saddam had terrible consequences that we did not foresee, and I Good faith and (dis)honest mistakes? Learning from Britain's Iraq War Inquiry understand all the criticism, but when I look at it today…I think we still we moved with the grain of where the future is going to be in the country and in the region… (Blair 2016b Chilcot report, it goes unchallenged that emancipation would be best achieved through market reform. The question of whether 'we are sure of our case' could be answered with greater certainty within Downing Street because the intervention generated an opportunity to restructure Iraq into a free market economy, which it would eventually have to become.
Concluding remarks
An inquiry is an exercise in public reason. We should then recall Foucault's warnings of an apparent "blackmail of the Enlightenment" whereby one is forced to be either for or against reason when this reason is actually a contingent knowledge (1984: 42). Foucault's argument is not that we must reject reason. We can, however, understand that so much as the Enlightenment is an attempt to define the limits of knowledge, this stands in opposition to the constant critique of ourselves. Otherwise, we fail to recognize that our own reason must be conditioned by historical and cultural circumstances. functions as a palliative discourse, providing the audience with relief from the symptoms of the problem while ignoring the deeper rationalities and practices that give rise to these acts of violence and exclusion. Breaking with this juridical individualism in public and official discourse would make the task of learning lessons radically different. It would make the distinction between past and present, the accountable and the innocent, far harder to maintain. The resort to individualism may be a highly sophisticated and anonymous means of ensuring that these questions are not asked. 
